What Section 26 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act Does

Mandatory dismissal for knowing, material dishonesty. Section 26 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 obliges the court to dismiss a personal injuries action built on knowingly false or misleading evidence. The obligation is not discretionary in the ordinary sense: once the statutory conditions are met, the court "shall dismiss the plaintiff's action" unless dismissal would itself result in injustice being done. The provision sits at the centre of how a contested personal injury claim in Ireland is tested for honesty, and it was enacted alongside the verifying affidavit (section 14) and the false evidence offence (section 25) as a single reform package aimed at false and exaggerated claims. The Act's long title states the purpose directly: where a plaintiff in a personal injuries action gives false evidence, the court may dismiss the action (Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, s. 26, irishstatutebook.ie). The section carries the marginal note "Fraudulent actions" in the Act, and a motion invoking it is known in practice simply as a "section 26 application".

The operative subsection reads:

"26.—(1) If, after the commencement of this section, a plaintiff in a personal injuries action gives or adduces, or dishonestly causes to be given or adduced, evidence that— (a) is false or misleading, in any material respect, and (b) he or she knows to be false or misleading, the court shall dismiss the plaintiff's action unless, for reasons that the court shall state in its decision, the dismissal of the action would result in injustice being done."

Section 26(1), Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 (No. 31 of 2004), irishstatutebook.ie

Three elements do the work, and the Court of Appeal restated them in that order in Lynch v Motor Insurers' Bureau of Ireland [2026] IECA 95. First, evidence must actually be given or adduced by or for the plaintiff (or a section 14 affidavit sworn: see section 26(2) below). Second, that evidence must be false or misleading in a material respect, and the plaintiff must know it to be so. Third, even where both are established, the action survives if the court concludes, for stated reasons, that dismissal would result in injustice. Section 26(4) applied the provision from 20 September 2004 to new actions and to actions already pending on that date.

Two consequences of the drafting matter more than anything else on this page. The dismissal is of "the plaintiff's action" as a whole: the High Court in Meehan v BKNS Curtain Walling Systems Ltd [2012] IEHC 441 confirmed, and the Court of Appeal in Platt repeated, that the court cannot excise the contaminated parts and award damages on the honest remainder. A claimant with a genuine injury who tells one knowing, material lie about its extent therefore risks the entire claim, even where the defendant has been found liable for the accident. The second consequence cuts the other way: because the section is, in the words of Peart J, draconian by design, the courts give it a strict construction and hold defendants to a demanding standard of proof before invoking it.

One boundary point is worth stating for completeness. Section 26 speaks to "personal injuries actions", meaning proceedings before the courts. The assessment stage before the Injuries Resolution Board comes earlier in the process and sits outside the section's dismissal power, although what a claimant said at that stage can surface later as evidence in the action.

What Counts as Exaggeration, and What Does Not

Only a knowing, material falsehood engages the section. Section 26 catches deliberate dishonesty about something that matters to the claim; it does not catch honest mistakes, imperfect memory, or genuine disagreement between doctors about prognosis. The statute defines the mental element itself:

"(3) For the purposes of this section, an act is done dishonestly by a person if he or she does the act with the intention of misleading the court."

Section 26(3), Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, irishstatutebook.ie

The test is subjective. The Supreme Court held in Ahern v Bus Éireann [2011] IESC 44 that "knowingly" looks to what this plaintiff actually knew and intended, not to what a reasonable person would have disclosed, and an appellate court will not disturb a trial judge's assessment of the plaintiff's honesty made after seeing the witness tested (a point applied again in Goodwin v Bus Éireann [2012] IESC 9 and in O'Sullivan v Brozda [2022] IECA 163). The Court of Appeal in Lynch [2026] IECA 95 drew the same line in practical terms: a witness who is merely misguided, mistaken or even unreasonable in how they describe their symptoms has not been shown to be subjectively dishonest.

Materiality has two limbs. The evidence must be material to the claim, and it must be false or misleading to a material degree; the defendant does not have to prove the whole claim is bogus, yet the falsehood must be substantial enough to render the claim itself fraudulent. That formulation, drawn together across the authorities and set out comprehensively by Collins J in O'Sullivan v Brozda [2022] IECA 163, is why trivial slips do not trigger dismissal while a false loss of earnings schedule can. The burden of proving every element rests on the defendant. Although the standard is the civil balance of probabilities, Quirke J held in Farrell v Dublin Bus [2010] IEHC 327 that the gravity of the consequences requires the court to be satisfied as a matter of high probability, and the Court of Appeal in Keating v Mulligan [2022] IECA 257 repeated that the threshold requirements must be clearly established before an order is made.

The courts have policed the boundary in both directions. The High Court observed in Murphy v Palmer [2021] IEHC 154 that the section exists to prevent fraudulent claims, not to serve as a weapon against ordinary weaknesses in a plaintiff's case, and the High Court in Smith v HSE [2013] IEHC 360 warned that section 26 is there to deter and disallow fraudulent claims, not to reward a forensic assault on anomalies, inconsistencies and unexplained circumstances. In Foxe v Codd [2022] IEHC 351, evidence the judge considered "perhaps misleading" from a generally honest and credible witness, who explained the inconsistencies, did not meet the threshold. A claimant whose account has gaps is in a different category from a claimant who lies.

The Verifying Affidavit Route: Section 26(2)

A knowingly false sworn affidavit triggers the same mandatory dismissal. Section 26(2) applies the identical rule where a person has sworn an affidavit under section 14 that is false or misleading in a material respect and knew it to be so when swearing it. Section 14 requires the parties to a personal injuries action to verify on oath the assertions in their pleadings, including the particulars of injury and the schedule of special damage served with a personal injuries summons. The affidavit is the bridge between what a claimant's solicitors plead and the claimant's personal responsibility for its truth, which is why the two provisions are read together: the pleading is verified under section 14, and a knowingly false verification is punished under section 26(2). The mechanics of swearing are covered on the companion page on the verifying affidavit in personal injury cases.

The reported dismissals show how this route operates. In Higgins v Caldark Ltd [2010] IEHC 527, Quirke J dismissed a claim where the verifying affidavit supported a loss of earnings case that concealed the plaintiff's continuing salary arrangement, even though the defendant had been found 75 per cent liable for the accident itself. In Waliszewski v McArthur & Co [2015] IEHC 264, replies to particulars verified on affidavit failed to disclose a later road traffic accident, and the plaintiff repeated the omission to the defence doctor; the action was dismissed. Two further features of the case law deserve attention. A defendant need not have pleaded section 26 in its defence, because the section responds to conduct during the litigation and can be raised at the close of the plaintiff's case. And the obligation of verified truth is not one-sided: section 14 binds defendants too, so a defence sworn in the teeth of contradictory evidence carries its own exposure.

When Does Dismissing a Personal Injury Claim Under Section 26 Cause an Injustice?

The safety valve is real but narrow. Section 26 stays its own hand in one situation only: where the court concludes, for reasons it must state in its decision, that dismissal would result in injustice being done. Understanding how the courts read that proviso determines whether compensation for injury in Ireland survives once a knowing, material falsehood has been proved, and the short answer is that it rarely does. Quirke J held in Higgins v Caldark [2010] IEHC 527 that the court's discretion at this point is limited, and that depriving a dishonest plaintiff of the damages they would otherwise have recovered is not, of itself, the injustice the subsection contemplates. The Court of Appeal in Platt put the same point in legislative terms: the Oireachtas anticipated that genuine losses would be forfeited when it enacted the section.

The proviso is not a dead letter. In Looby v Fatalski [2014] IEHC 564, Barr J accepted that the plaintiff had lied about the distances he could cycle, yet held that dismissing a claim whose core disability was honest would work an injustice, and the action survived. The reasoning across the cases treats the proviso as a proportionality check on the outer edge of the section rather than a general discretion to forgive dishonesty, which is consistent with the purpose Peart J identified at the very start of the jurisprudence:

"Section 26 was introduced by the Oireachtas for the very clear purpose of avoiding injustice to, inter alios, defendants against whom false or exaggerated claims are mounted in the hope of recovering damages to which such plaintiffs are not entitled. Such actions are also an abuse of the process of the court. … The section is certainly of a draconian nature, but it is deliberately so in the public interest, and is mandatory in its terms, once the court is so satisfied on the balance of probability, unless to dismiss the action would result in injustice being done."

per Peart J in Carmello v Casey [2007] IEHC 362; [2008] 3 IR 524 at [71]

The stated-reasons requirement matters in practice. A court refusing to dismiss despite proved dishonesty must explain itself in the decision, which keeps the proviso exceptional and reviewable. For claimants the practical lesson is the mirror image: the safety valve is no plan. The only reliable protection against section 26 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 is that the evidence given, and the affidavit sworn, are true.

How the Courts Have Applied Section 26 in Practice

Two decades of case law run from strict enforcement to policed restraint. The reported decisions between 2007 and 2026 form a coherent body: dismissals where surveillance or documents proved a knowing, material lie, refusals where the defendant reached too far, and a 2026 Court of Appeal ruling that exposed a gap in the section's drafting. One further datum frames all of it. A review by the legal publisher Decisis of more than 8,000 written judgments reported since January 2011 identified only around twenty applications to dismiss for false or misleading evidence, of which eleven succeeded and nine failed, one on appeal (as of 2021). Section 26 dismissals are real, and rare.

Across the authorities, and gathered by Collins J in O'Sullivan v Brozda [2022] IECA 163, the governing principles are these:

1. The onus of proving every element rests on the defendant (Farrell [2010] IEHC 327).
2. "Knowingly" is subjective: what this plaintiff actually knew and intended (Ahern [2011] IESC 44).
3. Materiality has two limbs, and the falsity must be substantial enough to render the claim itself fraudulent (Cahill [2018] IEHC 420).
4. The civil standard applies, satisfied as a matter of high probability (Farrell; Keating [2022] IECA 257).
5. Fair procedures require that the plaintiff be given a clear opportunity to answer the allegation in the hearing (Platt [2017] IECA 221).
6. Appellate courts defer to the trial judge's assessment of the plaintiff's honesty (Goodwin [2012] IESC 9; O'Sullivan).

How a Section 26 Application Is Made

The application is the defendant's to move, and it is made within the trial rather than by separate proceedings. A defendant need not have pleaded section 26 in its defence, because the section answers conduct during the litigation itself; in Waliszewski [2015] IEHC 264 it was raised at the close of the plaintiff's case. Fair procedures then govern what follows. The Court of Appeal in Platt [2017] IECA 221 held that a plaintiff must be given the opportunity, in the course of the hearing, to counter the assertion of knowingly false evidence, and because the section 26(3) test is subjective, Lynch [2026] IECA 95 confirms that the court ordinarily needs to assess the plaintiff under examination or cross-examination before it can find dishonesty. The ruling is delivered within the action, with reasons stated in the decision if the injustice proviso saves the claim.

1. The defendant moves the application within the trial, usually at the close of the plaintiff's case or after all the evidence.
2. The plaintiff is put on notice of the precise allegation and given the opportunity to answer it in evidence.
3. Cross-examination tests the subjective question: what this plaintiff actually knew and intended.
4. The court rules within the action, stating its reasons if the injustice proviso is applied.
5. Costs follow the outcome, including a differential costs order where an inflated claim drove the case into too high a court.

Consequences Beyond Dismissal: Costs and the Criminal Track

Dismissal is the civil consequence; costs and criminal exposure run separately. A plaintiff whose action is dismissed under section 26 will ordinarily face the costs of the proceedings, their own and the defendant's, which in a fought High Court action can exceed the value of the abandoned claim. Even where a section 26 application fails, an inflated claim carries a price: in Lynch, the High Court made a differential costs order under section 17(5) of the Courts Act 1981 because the €45,000 award belonged within the Circuit Court's jurisdiction, a route explained on our page on Circuit Court vs High Court jurisdiction.

The criminal track is distinct from section 26 itself. In answer to a 2018 parliamentary question, the Minister for Justice confirmed the Courts Service position that section 26 prescribes no offence, so no conviction can arise under it; the offences live elsewhere in the same Act. Section 25 makes it an offence to give, adduce or dishonestly cause false or misleading evidence in a personal injuries action, section 14(5) does the same for a false verifying affidavit, and section 29 sets the penalties: on conviction on indictment, a fine of up to €100,000 or imprisonment for up to 10 years or both; on summary conviction, a fine of up to €3,000 or up to 12 months or both. The Criminal Justice (Perjury and Related Offences) Act 2021 has since put the general law of perjury on a statutory footing, which is relevant wherever a sworn document is false. A private member's Civil Liability and Courts (Amendment) Bill 2021 proposed increased penalties, mandatory payment of the defendant's costs on dismissal, and a power to refer dismissed cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions; the Bill lapsed with the dissolution of the Dáil.

Defendants carry their own exposure. As Keating shows, an accusation of fraud made without evidence to support it can convert a failed section 26 application into an award of aggravated damages against the accuser, while Lackey v Kavanagh [2013] IEHC 341 confirms the converse: no aggravated damages follow where challenging the plaintiff's truthfulness was a reasonable response to the evidence. The section disciplines both sides of a personal injury claim, which is precisely what a credibility rule for the whole system should do.

What Honest Claimants Should Do

Full disclosure is what makes a claim section-26-proof. Every reported dismissal traces back to the same handful of behaviours: concealed prior or subsequent accidents, concealed earnings, and descriptions of incapacity that surveillance or records disproved. The published High Court decisions in recent years show non-disclosure of other accidents and previous injuries as the dominant battleground, so the protective steps for a genuine claimant are specific rather than general. Tell your solicitor about every previous injury and claim, every later accident, and every relevant medical condition, because Irish law already protects claimants with vulnerabilities: a pre-existing condition does not bar recovery for the worsening an accident causes, while concealing one can end the claim entirely.

Accuracy with the professionals matters as much as accuracy in court. What a claimant tells each examining doctor, including the defence's, feeds the reports the court will read, and in Platt the false accounts given to every expert were part of what condemned the claim; our page on defence medical examinations explains that setting. Describe capability honestly, including good days: a person with a genuine chronic injury who says "I can walk short distances on better days" has nothing to fear from footage of a walk. Treat social media as evidence, because insurers do; surveillance and insurance investigators routinely gather footage and posts, and in Danagher v Glantine Inns Ltd [2010] IEHC 214 the High Court dismissed a claim where the plaintiff’s own posts contradicted the sworn account of his restrictions. Keep the paperwork consistent too: the particulars in the summons, the replies, and the sworn affidavit should say the same true thing, and the page on evidence needed for a personal injury claim sets out how the honest record is built. None of this is about performing caution. It is the ordinary discipline that lets a genuine claim withstand the one statutory test every contested personal injuries action must pass under section 26 of the 2004 Act.

Frequently Asked Questions