Lodgments and Tender Offers in Irish Personal Injury Law: Procedure, Costs Consequences and Recent Reforms

What Lodgments and Tender Offers Are

A formal mechanism for shifting costs risk. Lodgments and tender offers are formal settlement procedures in Irish civil proceedings. A defendant offers the plaintiff a specified sum in full satisfaction of the claim. If the plaintiff rejects the offer and fails to beat it at trial, strict consequences for costs follow.

A lodgment is the actual deposit of money into court by a defendant, made under Order 22 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. A tender offer is a formal written offer made by a “qualified party” (principally insurers, the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland, the State, and State-indemnified parties) under Order 22 Rule 14, with no requirement to physically deposit funds. Once made, a tender is “deemed to be a lodgment” and produces the same procedural and costs consequences.

The two mechanisms exist to encourage settlement and reduce the consumption of judicial resources. In Ely v Dargan [1967] IR 89, Ó Dálaigh CJ identified a strong public policy interest in permitting a defendant to make a lodgment, in his memorable phrase, “at the eleventh hour”. That principle still underpins the regime sixty years later.

Pre-Litigation vs Post-Litigation: A Common Confusion

Order 22 lodgments and tender offers operate only once court proceedings have commenced. Before proceedings are issued, the equivalent settlement mechanism is the Injuries Resolution Board assessment process under the PIAB Act 2003, or informal without-prejudice negotiation. The Section 17 statutory formal offer, under the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, also operates only after proceedings have been issued. The deemed-tender mechanism under Section 51A(3A) is the bridge: an Injuries Resolution Board assessment, made pre-litigation but rejected by the claimant, is converted into a court-stage tender at the moment proceedings are issued.

The Seven Primary Sources Governing the Regime

Seven instruments interlock to shape every lodgment decision. The Irish lodgment and tender regime is not contained in a single Act or rule. It sits at the intersection of two sets of court rules and five statutes. A practitioner advising on whether to accept or reject an offer must, in practice, hold all seven in mind simultaneously.

The table below maps each source to the procedural moment it governs and the consequence it triggers. Each provision is cross-linked to its primary source.

Order 22 of the Rules of the Superior Courts: Timing, Procedure, and Tender Offers

Order 22 is the procedural spine of the regime. In any High Court action for debt or damages, a defendant may, under Order 22 Rule 1 RSC, pay a sum of money into court in satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim. The defendant may do so with or without an admission of liability.

The Standard Timing Windows

For personal injury actions, the defendant may lodge once without leave of the court within two standard windows: at the time of delivery of the Defence, or within four months from the date of service of the Notice of Trial. Outside these windows, leave of the court is required, and the court has discretion to grant leave on conditions. Rule 1(7) provides:

In actions other than those mentioned in paragraph (4) of this Rule, payment into Court shall be made within the time limited for delivering the defence, or at any later time by leave of the Court upon such terms and conditions as to the Court seem fit.

Order 22 Rule 1(7), Rules of the Superior Courts

Rule 1(9), originally inserted by SI 265/1993, granted an additional 21-day window where the plaintiff served replies to particulars or additional particulars after the standard windows had closed. This recognised that defendants could not realistically value a claim until they had seen the plaintiff’s case in detail.

The Medical-Report Window (SI 186/2022)

The most consequential recent reform is SI 186/2022, which came into operation on 26 April 2022. The instrument substitutes Rule 1(9) and extends the 21-day window to cover the service of a medical report:

Notwithstanding sub-rule (7), in any case in which the plaintiff has, after the expiry of the time within which a defendant could make a payment into Court without leave, served: (i) a notice of replies to particulars, or (ii) additional particulars (without a request therefor), or (iii) a report of a medical practitioner concerning the plaintiff in a personal injuries action, in accordance with or for the purposes of Order 39, rule 46, the defendant may, thereupon, without leave, make a payment or increase any payment made into Court within 21 days from the date thereof upon notice to the plaintiff.

Order 22 Rule 1(9) RSC, as substituted by SI 186/2022

The amendment does not, on its face, distinguish between a liability report and a condition-and-prognosis report. The practical effect, as observed by the former President of the High Court, is that a defendant can now respond to late-served medical evidence by making or increasing a lodgment within 21 days, without having to seek the court’s leave. In medical negligence litigation, where condition-and-prognosis reports are routinely exchanged in the weeks before trial, this can move the financial pressure substantially closer to the courthouse steps.

Tender Offers and Qualified Parties (Rule 14)

Order 22 Rule 14 permits a defined class of institutional defendants to issue a Notice of Tender rather than physically depositing funds in court. The notice is made on one of the prescribed forms set out in Appendix C to the Rules: Form No. 4A where liability is denied, or Form No. 5A where liability is admitted. The notice carries the same legal weight as a lodgment, and the same non-disclosure and costs rules apply. The four categories of qualified party are: the State (Ministers, the Attorney General, the Government); parties indemnified by the State (covering hospitals and consultants indemnified by the State Claims Agency); authorised insurers; and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland.

Multiple Defendants: Plaintiff Acceptance Under Rule 12 and Inter-Defendant Tenders Under Rule 15

Joint defendants can lodge separately or jointly. Where a plaintiff sues two or more defendants jointly or in the alternative, Order 22 Rule 12 RSC permits one or more of the defendants to pay money into court upon notice to the other defendants. This pattern is common in medical negligence, where a claimant may sue a hospital, a consultant, and a referring practitioner in a single action. The rule provides:

Money may be paid into Court under this Order by one or more of several defendants sued jointly or in the alternative upon notice to the other defendant or defendants. If the plaintiff elects within the time limited by this Order to accept the money paid into Court, he shall give notice as in rule 4 mentioned to each defendant and thereupon all further proceedings in the action or in respect of the specified cause or causes of action (as the case may be) shall be stayed and the money shall not be paid out except in pursuance of an order of the Court dealing with the whole costs of the action or cause or causes of action (as the case may be).

Order 22 Rule 12, Rules of the Superior Courts

The acceptance of a Rule 12 lodgment carries specific procedural consequences. If the plaintiff accepts the money, all further proceedings against the lodging defendants are stayed. The money cannot, however, be paid out to the plaintiff without a court order dealing with the entire costs of the action.

Where issues of contribution or apportionment of liability arise between co-defendants themselves, a separate mechanism applies. Order 22 Rule 15 RSC (inserted by SI 249 of 2005, effective 2 June 2005) governs “tenders between defendants”. Under Rule 15, where any issue arises in proceedings as to the apportionment of liability between defendants, and one or more of those defendants is a qualified party within the meaning of Rule 14, that defendant (the “offeror”) may make to any other defendant (the “offeree”) a written offer to pay a specified amount of the total damages for which the defendants may be liable to the plaintiff. If the offeree rejects the offer and the offeror’s eventual liability does not exceed the amount offered, the offeree is liable to the offeror for the costs of the apportionment issue from the date of the offer (unless the trial judge for special cause shown otherwise directs). Rule 15 sits in parallel with the third-party procedure under Order 16 Rule 12 and provides a tender mechanism on the inter-defendant apportionment question without involving the plaintiff.

Acceptance Procedure and the 14-Day Window

Acceptance is a strict, time-limited procedural step. Order 22 Rule 4 RSC fixes the plaintiff’s window for accepting a lodgment at “fourteen days of the receipt of notice of payment into Court, or within such further period as may be agreed upon by the parties”. Acceptance is effected by serving a Notice of Acceptance on the defendant within the window, in Form No. 6 in Appendix C.

On acceptance, the proceedings are stayed in respect of the accepted claim, and the plaintiff becomes entitled to draw down the lodged sum. The plaintiff is then entitled to tax their costs to the date of acceptance and, after a short statutory interval, sign judgment for those costs. In the Circuit Court the equivalent acceptance window under Order 15 Circuit Court Rules is 28 days, reflecting the lower-value claims and longer typical correspondence cycles in that jurisdiction. Where the lodgment is partial (covering some but not all causes of action in a multi-cause claim), acceptance may be made only as to specified causes if the lodgment is expressed to be in respect of those causes. Where the plaintiff is a minor, the 14-day automatic acceptance window does not operate: Section 63 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 requires court approval before any compromise takes effect, irrespective of the plaintiff’s wish to accept.

Non-Disclosure to the Trial Judge (Rule 7)

The fact that a lodgment or tender has been made, and the amount, is not disclosed to the trial judge until all issues of liability and quantum have been decided. The rule protects the integrity of the assessment by ensuring the judge is not subconsciously anchored by the defendant’s valuation. SI 396/2013 strengthened the equivalent non-disclosure rule for tender offers, aligning their treatment with lodgments.

Specialised Variations: Defamation, Admiralty, and Defended-Title Actions

Three statutory carve-outs sit outside the standard Order 22 framework. The general lodgment regime under Rule 1 does not apply uniformly across all civil actions. Section 29 of the Defamation Act 2009 provides a specialised lodgment mechanism for defamation proceedings:

In an action for damages for defamation the defendant may, upon giving notice in writing to the plaintiff, pay a sum of money into court in satisfaction of the action when filing his or her defence to the action. ... The defendant shall not be required to admit liability in an action for damages for defamation when making a payment to which this section applies.

Section 29(1) and 29(4), Defamation Act 2009

Section 29 sits alongside, but is distinct from, the “offer to make amends” procedure under Section 22 of the same Act, which combines an offer to publish a correction and apology with a payment of compensation. In admiralty actions, Order 22 Rule 1(4) RSC applies its own timing rules reflecting the in rem character of those proceedings. In actions where the defence raises a question of title to land, money may not be paid into court unless liability is explicitly admitted in the defence, departing from the standard Rule 1(7) discretion. These three carve-outs are noted here for completeness; the practical centre of gravity in Irish personal injury practice remains the standard Rule 1 regime and the Rule 14 tender mechanism.

The Other Six Sources: From Section 17 to Order 99

Six further instruments fill the architecture. Order 22 governs the procedure, but the wider statutory and rule framework shapes when an offer must be made, who may make it, and what happens to the costs if it succeeds or fails.

Section 17 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004

Section 17 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 introduced a separate statutory regime for formal settlement offers in personal injury actions. Each party must, at a prescribed pre-trial date, serve a formal offer of settlement (or, in the case of a defendant, a notice that no offer will be made). The prescribed date was fixed by SI 169/2005.

Critically, Section 17(6) preserves the existing rules-of-court mechanism. The subsection provides:

This section is in addition to and not in substitution for any rule of court providing for the payment into court of a sum of money in satisfaction of a cause of action or the making of a tender, offer or payment without prejudice or otherwise in connection with the settlement of a personal injuries action.

Section 17(6), Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004

The two regimes coexist: a defendant may serve a Section 17 formal offer and a separate Order 22 lodgment in the same action, and the court will have regard to both when ruling on costs.

Section 51A of the PIAB Act 2003 and the Deemed Tender Regime

Section 51A of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 deals with the costs consequences where an Injuries Resolution Board assessment is rejected by the claimant but accepted by the respondent. The body is now known as the Injuries Resolution Board, formerly known as PIAB until 2023. Section 51A was substantially rewritten by the Personal Injuries Resolution Board Act 2022. The new subsection 51A(3A) came into operation on 13 February 2023.

The substituted subsection provides:

Subject to subsections (6) and (7), if, as respects a relevant claim to which this section applies, a claimant brings proceedings in accordance with this Act, a respondent, as the defendant in the relevant proceedings, shall be deemed to have made an offer of tender of payment pursuant to rules of court on the relevant date equal to the amount of the assessment in relation to the relevant claim concerned.

Section 51A(3A), Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 (substituted by Personal Injuries Resolution Board Act 2022, in force 13 February 2023)

The deeming language is critical: the accepted assessment is treated for costs purposes as if it were a formal tender lodged on the assessment date. A claimant who fails to recover more than the assessment at trial is then exposed to the standard cost-shifting consequence under Order 22 Rule 6. The court retains a narrow override under Section 51A(3A)(b) where it finds, on special cause shown, that the respondent was not in a position to pay the assessment sum on the relevant date.

The empirical context for the reform is significant. The Injuries Resolution Board Annual Report 2024 records 8,598 assessments of compensation made (down from 9,144 in 2023), with a total compensation value of €168 million, a median award of €13,100 and an average award of €19,482 across all claim categories. The respondent consent rate (the proportion of respondents agreeing to engage with the Board’s process) was 70 per cent, and the overall acceptance rate (the proportion of assessments accepted by both claimant and respondent) was 50 per cent. The 50 per cent of assessments in 2024 that did not result in mutual acceptance now carry materially greater costs exposure than any prior cohort, because every accepted respondent assessment that proceeds to court becomes a deemed Order 22 tender on the assessment date.

Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015

Section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, commenced on 7 October 2019, replaced the older common-law “costs follow the event” principle with a statutory framework. Section 169(1) provides:

A party who is entirely successful in civil proceedings is entitled to an award of costs against a party who is not successful in those proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise, having regard to the particular nature and circumstances of the case, and the conduct of the proceedings by the parties.

Section 169(1), Legal Services Regulation Act 2015

The seven listed factors in Section 169(1)(a) to (g) include, at subsection (f), “whether a party made an offer to settle the matter the subject of the proceedings, and if so, the date, terms and circumstances of that offer”. This is the statutory hook that brings every settlement offer, whether a formal Order 22 lodgment, a Section 17 offer, a deemed Section 51A tender, or a Calderbank letter, within the court’s costs discretion.

Murray J in Higgins v Irish Aviation Authority [2020] IECA 277 made a further observation. Although the phrase “costs follow the event” appears in the marginal note of Section 169, it does not appear in the substantive text of the section itself. The phrase has been “purged completely” from Order 99 of the Rules of the Superior Courts as recast in 2019. The doctrinal weight of the default rule has, on this view, softened in favour of a flexible discretion guided by the statutory factors.

Section 63 of the Civil Liability Act 1961

Where the plaintiff is a minor, Section 63 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 imposes a mandatory court-approval requirement on any compromise of the action. The 14-day automatic acceptance window under Order 22 Rule 5 does not operate in minor cases. Instead, the plaintiff’s next friend must apply to the court for a ruling, and the court must be satisfied that the settlement amount is in the best interests of the minor before the lodgment can be accepted.

Order 15 Circuit Court Rules: The Circuit Court Analog

Personal injury claims within the Circuit Court jurisdiction (currently up to €60,000) are governed by Order 15 of the Circuit Court Rules, as restated for Dublin and the non-Dublin Circuits. The acceptance window is 28 days rather than 14, and the rules differ slightly on the admission of liability. The substantive cost-shifting principle is the same as in the High Court.

Order 99 Rules 57–61 RSC: Lodgments at the Costs Adjudication Stage

Distinct from the action-stage Order 22 regime, Order 99 Rules 57 to 61 RSC provide for a parallel lodgment and tender mechanism operating at the costs adjudication stage. Where a party has been awarded costs to be adjudicated by the Legal Costs Adjudicator, the paying party may lodge a sum in satisfaction of those costs. The same cost-shifting logic applies: if the receiving party does not recover more than the lodged sum on adjudication, the paying party is entitled to its costs of the adjudication from the date of the lodgment.

How the Lodgment Regime Has Been Amended

Five statutory milestones shaped the modern regime. The Irish lodgment regime traces back to the original Rules of the Superior Courts 1986, but the modern shape of the practice has been determined by a sequence of amendments running from 2000 to 2023.

The trajectory of the amendments shows a steady tightening of the costs pressure on plaintiffs. The 2000 reform made tender offers easier for insurers. The 2013 reform reinforced their non-disclosure. The 2022 reform expanded the windows in which a defendant could lodge without leave. The 2023 reform converted accepted Injuries Resolution Board assessments into deemed tenders. Across the two decades, the regime has moved consistently in the direction of giving defendants more, and earlier, tools to crystallise the financial risk that a plaintiff carries to trial.

Leading Cases Interpreting Lodgment and Tender Procedure

Six decisions define the modern lodgment doctrine. The case law on lodgments and tender offers spans nearly sixty years. It ranges across the public-policy foundation of the regime, the doctrine of late lodgment leave, the costs treatment of Calderbank-style offers, and the most recent Supreme Court guidance on the operation of Section 169 LSRA 2015.

Absent mala fides, manifest unfairness or some other disentitling circumstance, the court should grant leave to make or increase a lodgment, having regard both to the public interest in permitting late lodgments to deter unnecessary litigation, and to the equitable consideration that the granting of leave should not confer undue litigation advantage on the defendant.

Coffey J, O'Malley v Hermann & Galway Clinic Doughiska Ltd [2022] IEHC 9 (judgment of 12 January 2022)

The Mathematics of Cost Penalties: Browne v Van Geene

A €260,111 win became a financial loss. The starkest recent illustration of how Order 22 Rule 6 operates in practice is the medical negligence action of Browne v Van Geene and Mount Carmel Medical Group (Kilkenny) Ltd trading as Aut Even Hospital [2017] IEHC 612. Mr Justice Barr delivered judgment on 20 October 2017.

The clinical facts were uncontested. The plaintiff underwent a total abdominal hysterectomy in April 2010. During the operation a suture was placed in the ureter leading to the left kidney, causing obstruction and damage that ultimately required the kidney to be removed in April 2013. Liability was admitted, and the trial proceeded as a quantum assessment alone.

Prior to trial the defendants made two lodgments, both rejected by the plaintiff on advice. The first, of €280,000, took effect on 27 September 2016. The second, an increased lodgment of €450,000, followed. Barr J’s judgment awarded the plaintiff €260,111 in total damages, an amount falling short of even the first lodgment. The default costs rule under Order 22 Rule 6 was triggered: the plaintiff recovered her costs only to 27 September 2016, and the defendants recovered their costs from that date through the entirety of trial preparation and the hearing itself. The two sets of costs were directed to be taxed and set off against each other, with any shortfall deducted from the plaintiff’s award.

The case captures the mathematics of lodgment risk in a single set of figures. A plaintiff who objectively succeeded on the clinical merits, in an admitted-liability action, with a quarter-of-a-million-euro award, still lost most of the financial benefit of that award to defence costs incurred after the lodgment date. The figures provide a cautionary discipline: the practical cost of rejecting a lodgment must be measured not against the headline damages but against the net recovery after costs.

Calderbank Offers and the Wider Settlement-Offer Architecture

The fourth limb sits outside Order 22. Irish practice recognises a fourth settlement mechanism alongside the formal Order 22 lodgment, the Section 17 statutory offer, and the deemed Section 51A tender: the Calderbank offer, a written settlement proposal made “without prejudice save as to costs”. Its name comes from the English Court of Appeal decision in Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93, a matrimonial case in which the privilege boundary between liability and costs was articulated.

In Ireland, Calderbank offers were recognised in personal injury practice from at least O'Neill v Ryanair Ltd (No 2) [1992] 1 IR 160, and the Court of Appeal in Shannon v O'Sullivan [2016] IECA 93 confirmed their place in modern PI costs analysis. The Calderbank mechanism has now been substantially absorbed into the statutory framework of Section 169(1)(f) LSRA 2015, which directs courts to have regard to the terms and circumstances of any settlement offer when exercising costs discretion. In Ireland, Calderbank offers therefore operate as one factor within the Section 169 statutory framework rather than as a freestanding common-law doctrine. This differs from the position in England and Wales, where Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 now codifies the equivalent regime as a self-contained procedural code.

For the full doctrinal treatment of Calderbank offers, the Section 169 costs framework, and the interaction with costs differential orders, see the companion reference page on Costs Orders and Calderbank Letters in Irish Practice. The present page addresses Calderbank only as the fourth limb of the broader settlement-offer architecture.

Lodgments and Tender Offers in Practice

Practice turns on three doctrinal tensions. The integrated lodgment and tender regime, taken across all seven sources, produces three areas of doctrinal disagreement that practitioners must navigate when advising on offers.

Evaluating an Offer: A Six-Part Framework for Plaintiffs

The decision to accept or reject is the highest-stakes procedural choice in most personal injury actions. The case of Browne v Van Geene illustrates that the net financial outcome can diverge sharply from the headline damages. The framework below structures the analysis any plaintiff and solicitor should run through on receipt of a lodgment, tender, or deemed Section 51A tender.

1. Award-range comparison. How does the offered amount compare to the realistic award range under the Personal Injuries Guidelines, held binding by the Supreme Court in Delaney v PIAB [2024] IESC 10? An offer materially below the Guidelines mid-range bears scrutiny; an offer at or above the upper-range warrants serious consideration.
2. Costs exposure calculation. If the offer is rejected and the trial award falls short, what is the defendant’s likely post-offer costs bill, and how does the net recovery compare to acceptance now? The Browne v Van Geene mathematics provide a cautionary baseline.
3. Particularisation and evidence completeness. Have all heads of claim (general damages, loss of earnings past and future, care, special damages) been fully particularised and supported by current medical, vocational, and actuarial evidence? An under-particularised claim invites under-valuation.
4. Contributory negligence and apportionment risk. Is there a credible defendant case for contributory negligence, joint causation, or apportionment to a co-defendant? Any of these reduces the headline figure against which the offer is measured.
5. Remaining procedural steps. What further steps (discovery, expert exchange, mediation, updated condition-and-prognosis reports) may reasonably shift the value range? An offer made before late-served evidence carries different weight than one made after.
6. Defendant track record. What is the defendant’s pattern on offer increases, late-window lodgments, and willingness to pursue costs taxation after partial wins? Some defendants make conservative opening offers and routinely improve them; others adopt a take-it-or-leave-it posture.

The framework is descriptive, not prescriptive. The weight of each factor varies by case. Plaintiffs should treat this as a structured starting point for solicitor consultation, not as a substitute for advice tailored to the specific evidence and forensic profile of the claim.

The Three Doctrinal Tensions

The integrated lodgment and tender regime, taken across all seven sources, produces three areas of doctrinal disagreement that practitioners must navigate when advising on offers.

The first tension is interpretive. Murray J in Higgins v IAA [2020] IECA 277 described the phrase “costs follow the event” as having been “purged completely” from the substantive text of Section 169. Mulcahy J in Burke v Mediahuis Ireland Ltd [2024] IEHC 424 reaffirmed the default position that the entirely successful party is entitled to costs, suggesting that the “starting point” remains substantively intact. The Supreme Court in ESB v Good [2025] IESC 40 reconciled the two views by adopting the “big issue” approach: the default applies where one party is entirely successful, but where neither party is, the discretion is at large.

The second tension is procedural. The relationship between the Order 22 Rule 1(9) medical-report window introduced in 2022 and the older Rule 1(7) leave application has not been comprehensively addressed in subsequent case law. The position remains that where a defendant falls outside the 21-day medical-report window, the leave principles of Ely v Dargan and O'Malley v Hermann continue to govern. The interaction between the two routes when both might in principle apply remains contestable.

The third tension concerns the deemed-tender provision in Section 51A(3A). The provision is silent on how the deemed tender interacts with contributory negligence findings. If a claimant’s award is reduced for contributory negligence below the assessment figure, it is not yet settled whether the deemed-tender consequence operates on the gross award or the net recovery. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed this question.

Frequently Asked Questions

Glossary of Key Terms

Eight terms recur throughout this article. Each definition reflects the term’s settled meaning in Irish civil practice.

Lodgment

The deposit of a specified sum of money into court by a defendant under Order 22 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (or Order 15 of the Circuit Court Rules), made in satisfaction of the plaintiff’s claim. A lodgment may be made with or without an admission of liability.

Tender Offer

A formal written offer of payment in satisfaction of a civil claim, made by a “qualified party” under Order 22 Rule 14 RSC. Unlike a lodgment, no funds are physically deposited in court. A tender offer is deemed to be a lodgment for all procedural and costs purposes.

Qualified Party

A defendant entitled under Order 22 Rule 14 RSC to make a tender offer without depositing funds in court. The four categories are: the State (Ministers, Attorney General, Government); parties indemnified by the State (including HSE hospitals and consultants indemnified by the State Claims Agency); authorised insurers; and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Ireland.

Calderbank Offer

A written settlement proposal made “without prejudice save as to costs”, named after the English Court of Appeal decision in Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93. In Ireland, Calderbank offers operate within the Section 169(1)(f) Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 statutory factor framework when the court exercises costs discretion.

Deemed Tender

An accepted Injuries Resolution Board assessment that, under Section 51A(3A) of the PIAB Act 2003 (substituted by the Personal Injuries Resolution Board Act 2022, in force 13 February 2023), is treated as a tender of payment made on the assessment date for the purpose of court costs consequences if the claimant subsequently fails to recover more than the assessment at trial.

Tender of Amends (Offer to Make Amends)

The settlement mechanism in defamation proceedings under Section 22 of the Defamation Act 2009. The defendant offers to publish a suitable correction and apology and to pay compensation as agreed or as the court determines. The Section 22 offer is distinct from a Section 29 lodgment, though both may operate in the same defamation action.

Notice of Tender

The formal written instrument by which a qualified party makes a tender offer under Order 22 Rule 14 RSC. The notice is made on Form No. 4A (where liability is denied) or Form No. 5A (where liability is admitted), set out in Appendix C to the Rules of the Superior Courts.

Notice of Acceptance

The formal written instrument by which a plaintiff accepts a lodgment or tender offer under Order 22 Rule 4 RSC. Acceptance must be served on the defendant within 14 days of receipt of the offer (or 28 days in the Circuit Court), unless the parties agree in writing on a longer period.