Circuit Court vs High Court Jurisdiction in Personal Injury Claims (Ireland)
Author: Gary Matthews, Principal Solicitor — Law Society of Ireland PC No. S8178 • 3rd Floor, Ormond Building, 31–36 Ormond Quay Upper, Dublin D07 • 01 903 6408 • •
Contents
1. The three-court architecture for personal injury claims
Three Irish courts hear personal injury claims, divided by the monetary value of the claim. The District Court handles claims up to €15,000, the Circuit Court handles personal injury actions valued between €15,000 and €60,000, and the High Court handles anything above. These limits are set by Part 3 of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013, commenced on 3 February 2014 by SI 566/2013, and have not been increased since.
The High Court derives its unlimited original civil jurisdiction directly from Article 34.3.1 of the Constitution, which vests in the High Court "full original jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and questions whether of law or fact, civil or criminal." It is the only first-instance forum for catastrophic injuries, fatal injury actions of significant dependency value, and the great majority of medical negligence cases. The Circuit Court was established under the Courts of Justice Act 1924 and has a strictly local jurisdiction in tort — proceedings must be issued in the county where the wrong was alleged to have occurred or where a defendant ordinarily resides or carries on business, per the Courts Service.
| Court | Current PI limit (May 2026) | Proposed limit (Civil Reform Bill 2025) | Statutory authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| District Court | Up to €15,000 | Up to €20,000 (proposed; not enacted) | Part 3, CCLMPA 2013 §2(1) |
| Circuit Court (personal injury) | €15,000 – €60,000 | €20,000 – €100,000 (proposed; not enacted) | Part 3, CCLMPA 2013; PI sub-limit imports definition from section 2, Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 |
| Circuit Court (general civil) | Up to €75,000 | Up to €100,000 (proposed; not enacted) | Part 3, CCLMPA 2013 |
| High Court | No ceiling | No ceiling (unchanged) | Constitution, Article 34; Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 |
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2. Where the €60,000 personal injury limit comes from
The €60,000 cap is a personal-injury sub-limit, distinct from the €75,000 general civil cap. It is found in Part 3 of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 (CCLMPA 2013) and was commenced on 3 February 2014 by the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 (Jurisdiction of District and Circuit Court) (Commencement) Order 2013 (SI 566/2013).
What makes a claim a "personal injury action" for these purposes is governed by section 2 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, which defines the term for the wider statutory regime. The 2013 Act imports that definition. The practical effect is a two-track Circuit Court cap: a contract claim worth €68,000 may be brought in the Circuit Court, but a personal injury claim of the same value must be issued in the High Court.
The €60,000 limit was the largest absolute increase in Irish personal injury jurisdiction since 1991, when the Courts Act 1991 doubled the Circuit Court ceiling. It has, however, remained static for twelve years while the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices has risen by roughly 16.7% — the inflation figure approved by the Board of the Judicial Council on 21 October 2024, which modified upward the Personal Injuries Guidelines Committee's earlier recommendation of 15.6%, with the draft amendments as modified by the Board published on 12 December 2024. That sustained erosion is the principal policy driver behind the Civil Reform Bill 2025, addressed at Section 8.
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3. Lifting the limit: consent to unlimited Circuit Court jurisdiction
Parties may agree to lift the Circuit Court limits by written consent. The Circuit Court will then hear and determine a claim that would otherwise be reserved to the High Court. The Courts Service confirms the position: "the parties in a legal action can agree to lift these limits by agreeing to unlimited jurisdiction."
In practice, consent jurisdiction is used where both sides prefer the lower-cost forum, where local case-management dates are favourable to the parties' diary, or where a borderline case can be progressed faster than would be possible in the High Court list. The defendant has practical control: a plaintiff cannot unilaterally relocate a High-Court-value claim to the Circuit Court without consent, but a defendant facing exposure to High Court costs may welcome the offer.
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4. The costs trap: section 17(5) differential costs orders
A High Court award within Circuit Court jurisdiction triggers the section 17(5) discretion. Where a plaintiff sues in the High Court but receives damages that fall within the Circuit Court's jurisdiction, the trial judge may make a differential costs order under section 17(5) of the Courts Act 1981 (substituted by section 14 of the Courts Act 1991). The plaintiff is then ordered to pay the defendant the difference between the costs actually incurred in the High Court and the costs that would have been incurred had the action been brought in the Circuit Court.
How a differential costs order works
Section 17(5) of the Courts Act 1981, as substituted by section 14 of the Courts Act 1991, provides that the trial judge:
"… may, if in all the circumstances he thinks it appropriate so to do, make an order for the payment to the defendant by the plaintiff of an amount not exceeding whichever of the following the judge considers appropriate: (a) the amount, measured by the judge, of the additional costs as between party and party incurred in the proceedings by the defendant by reason of the fact that the proceedings were not commenced and determined in the said court of limited jurisdiction, or (b) an amount equal to the difference between (i) the amount of the costs as between party and party incurred in the proceedings by the defendant as taxed by a Taxing Master of the High Court or, in case the proceedings were heard and determined in the Circuit Court, the appropriate county registrar, and (ii) the amount of the costs as between party and party incurred in the proceedings by the defendant as taxed by the Taxing Master or county registrar, on a scale that he considers would have been appropriate if the proceedings had been commenced and determined in the said court of limited jurisdiction."
— Section 17(5) Courts Act 1981, as substituted by section 14 Courts Act 1991
Once a trial judge concludes that the award falls within a lower court's jurisdiction, two stages follow. First, the judge must decide whether to exercise the section 17(5) discretion at all. Second, if the order is made, the Legal Costs Adjudicator (the post-1858 successor to the Taxing Master) or the County Registrar calculates the difference between the two cost scales, with set-off between the parties' costs awards.
The downside for an Irish plaintiff is severe. High Court litigation typically attracts Senior Counsel, more elaborate discovery (or production-of-documents) work, and longer interlocutory motions — all of which generate costs out of proportion to a moderate damages award. In some cases, the costs differential exceeds the substantive recovery.
From O'Connor to Moin: the 2003–2018 shift
| Year | Authority | Effect on s.17(5) doctrine |
|---|---|---|
| 2003 | O'Connor v Bus Átha Cliath [2003] 4 IR 459 (SC, Hardiman J) | Articulates the legislative purpose: lower courts for lower-value claims. Followed sparingly for 15 years. |
| 2018 | Moin v Sicika [2018] IECA 240 (CoA, Peart J) | Watershed. "Incumbent" on the trial judge to make a differential order absent good reasons. |
| 2025 | Milmoe v Chatzis [2025] IECA 149 (CoA) | Calibrates Moin. No-warning-letter and complexity uncertainty defeat the application. |
| 2025 | Quinlan v Quinlan [2025] IEHC 170 (HC, Egan J) | Eight-principle working framework. Operational gloss for HC practice. |
| Dec 2025 | Putniene v McDonald [2025] IEHC 682 (HC, Twomey J) | Wider judicial commentary on systemic costs disproportion. Not binding on the costs test. |
O'Connor v Bus Átha Cliath
[2003] 4 IR 459 — Supreme Court (Hardiman J)
The Supreme Court articulated the legislative purpose of section 17. Hardiman J observed in O'Connor:
"… the legislative purpose is to provide a strong incentive to the institution of proceedings, generally, in the lowest court having jurisdiction to make the award appropriate to them."
— Hardiman J in O'Connor v Bus Átha Cliath [2003] 4 IR 459 (Supreme Court)
For fifteen years following that judgment, Irish practitioners observed that the section 17(5) discretion was, in the words of one Law Society Gazette analysis, "broadly ignored" by trial judges (see Dillon Eustace; Law Society Gazette, "Different Strokes").
Moin v Sicika and O'Malley v McEvoy
[2018] IECA 240 — Court of Appeal (Peart J)
The Court of Appeal reset the position. Both High Court trial judges had refused to make differential costs orders despite awards comfortably below the Circuit Court ceiling. Peart J allowed both appeals and stated, at paragraph 21:
"In my view, it is incumbent upon a trial judge, in circumstances where an award is significantly within the jurisdiction of a lower court, to make a differential order unless there are good reasons for not doing so."
— Peart J in Moin v Sicika and O'Malley v McEvoy [2018] IECA 240, at [21]
Peart J also relied on the "safety valve" in section 20 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 (as substituted by section 16 of the CCLMPA 2013): a Circuit Court can award above its normal limit on a remitted action, so plaintiffs are not penalised for moving down. The defendants in both cases had warned the plaintiffs in writing months before trial.
2025: discretion confirmed in Milmoe v Chatzis
Milmoe v Chatzis & Anor
[2025] IECA 149 — Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal clarified that the section 17(5) power remains discretionary. A €44,460 medical negligence award (within Circuit Court jurisdiction) had been the subject of a defendant application for a differential costs order; the trial judge refused. The Court of Appeal upheld the refusal. Two factors weighed against making the order: the jurisdictional outcome was not clear-cut at the outset because the case turned on scarring valuation for which the Book of Quantum (then operative) provided no guidance; and the defendant had issued no section 17 warning letter or other pre-trial engagement on jurisdiction.
The case did not overrule Moin; it calibrated it. Defendants who decline to warn before trial may forfeit their entitlement to a differential costs order even where the eventual award lands well below the Circuit ceiling (see Mason Hayes Curran analysis; Tughans analysis).
2025: Egan J's eight-principle framework in Quinlan v Quinlan
Martina Quinlan v Michael Quinlan
[2025] IEHC 170 — High Court (Egan J)
Egan J distilled the section 17(5) law into eight working principles. The High Court action arose from an assault. After medical-evidence difficulties at trial, only €25,000 in damages was awarded. The defendant had sent a section 17 warning letter prior to a scheduled adjournment; the plaintiff did not apply to remit. Egan J made a differential costs order, limited to the attendance-cost differential (€1,476 including VAT).
The Egan J framework: (1) regard must be had to the legislative purpose per O'Connor; (2) discretion is triggered by an award the lower court could have made; (3) significant within-jurisdiction is a weighty factor for granting the order; (4) the court considers whether there was a realistic basis for commencing in the higher court; (5) the court considers whether continuing in the higher court remained appropriate at each stage; (6) the order is harder to resist where a warning letter has issued; (7) there is no obligation on a defendant to apply to remit; (8) the plaintiff bears the ongoing duty to reassess and apply to adjourn for remittal where appropriate (see DAC Beachcroft commentary).
In December 2025, Mr Justice Michael Twomey expressed a wider critique. Dismissing Putniene v McDonald & Ors [2025] IEHC 682, a High Court appeal of a failed €16,500 soft-tissue claim, Twomey J observed:
"This Court's view, it cannot amount to true justice, for the resolution of a claim to cost multiples of its value. Instead of justice being administered to Ms Putniene, in this Court's view, she has had an injustice inflicted on her. This is because resolving her bona fide claim over a minor car accident … is likely to cost her several times the value of her claim."
— Twomey J in Putniene v McDonald & Ors [2025] IEHC 682 (High Court)
Twomey J's dictum is not binding precedent on costs orders. It is, however, judicial commentary on the same systemic feature that the Civil Reform Bill 2025 is intended to address — minor claims being heard in expensive forums because lower-court monetary thresholds have not kept pace with the typical value of personal injury awards.
The deep treatment of section 17(5), differential costs and Calderbank-style offers belongs on the planned /court-process/costs-orders-calderbank/ page; this section is intentionally summary.
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5. Remittal and transfer between courts
The High Court can remit a personal injury action down to a lower court at any time before trial. The statutory architecture is layered. Section 25 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 provides the primary statutory mechanism for remittal from the High Court — its main text covers remittal to the Circuit Court (where the action "might have been commenced in the Circuit Court"), and its proviso covers cases that should not have been commenced in the High Court but in the District Court. Section 11(2) of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 is the operational provision most commonly cited in modern practice for High Court to Circuit Court remittal applications. Section 15 of the Courts Act 1991 governs remittal from the Circuit Court to the District Court.
High Court to Circuit Court — the operative mechanism
The most common remittal in personal injury practice is High Court to Circuit Court under section 11(2) of the Courts of Justice Act 1936. A defendant typically applies once medical reports, particulars, and a defence have been exchanged and the case can be properly valued. The application is heard before a High Court judge, often on a Friday motions list. Where granted, the proceedings continue in the Circuit Court as if originally commenced there.
The above-limit safety valve on remittal
The critical feature for the plaintiff is the safety-valve introduced by section 16 of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013, which substituted section 20 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936. On a remitted action, the Circuit Court is empowered to award damages in excess of its normal monetary jurisdiction. Peart J in Moin v Sicika at [21] expressly relied on this safety valve as the reason a plaintiff need not fear remittal — if the case turns out to be worth more than €60,000 after all, the Circuit Court can still award the full amount on the remitted action.
Practical mechanics: application, order, filing
Once an order for transfer is made, strict timelines apply. Where the action is remitted from the High Court to the Circuit Court, the plaintiff must lodge all pleadings, the summons, and supporting documents with the County Registrar within fourteen days (per the relevant practice rules). The case then continues in the Circuit Court list of the county of issue or, where the originating forum was Dublin, the Dublin Circuit. Where the action is remitted to the District Court, Rule 8 of the District Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2014 (SI 17/2014) prescribes a parallel fourteen-day filing window with the District Court Clerk.
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6. How the Personal Injuries Guidelines shape forum choice
The Irish Personal Injuries Guidelines provide predictable bracket values, which in turn make forum choice more determinable at the outset. Adopted by the Judicial Council on 6 March 2021 under section 7(2)(g) of the Judicial Council Act 2019, the Guidelines were given binding legal effect by section 30 of the Family Leave and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2021, commenced on 24 April 2021. Section 22 of the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 requires courts and the Injuries Resolution Board to have regard to them in assessing general damages.
The Supreme Court in Delaney v The Personal Injuries Assessment Board, the Judicial Council, Ireland and the Attorney General [2024] IESC 10 confirmed that the Guidelines remain binding. The seven-judge bench held that section 7(2)(g) of the Judicial Council Act 2019, in its current form, was unconstitutional as contrary to the independence of the judiciary guaranteed by Article 35.2 of the Constitution. However, the majority found that section 30 of the Family Leave and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2021 amounted to independent ratification of the Guidelines by the Oireachtas — and that ratification cured the constitutional defect. Charleton J described the case as one of "systemic importance" affecting thousands of pending matters (see Irish Times reportage; Mason Hayes Curran).
The practical effect for forum choice is significant. Before 2021, quantum uncertainty offered an arguable basis for issuing in the higher court "to be safe". Under the Guidelines that argument has narrowed. Departure from the Guidelines is permitted only where there is "no reasonable proportion" between the Guidelines and the award the court considers should be made. A solicitor who issues in the High Court for a claim the Guidelines value at €40,000 has limited room to argue at trial that an award above €60,000 was a realistic prospect.
A second edition of the Guidelines, proposing a 16.7% inflation uplift, was published in draft by the Judicial Council in December 2024 and laid before the Oireachtas under the procedure set out in the Courts, Civil Law, Criminal Law and Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2024. In July 2025, the Government decided not to bring forward a resolution for Oireachtas approval. The 2021 first-edition Guidelines therefore remain in force as of May 2026. Chief Justice Donal O'Donnell warned in October 2025 that an out-of-date set of Guidelines undermines the system and that judges may be increasingly invited to depart from stagnant bracket values (see Law Society Gazette).
This is treated only at summary level here. The full doctrinal treatment of the Guidelines lives on the 2026 update to the Personal Injuries Guidelines page.
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7. Medical negligence: why it is almost always the High Court
Medical negligence actions are statutorily exempt from the Injuries Resolution Board, and their typical value places them in the High Court. Section 3(d) of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 excludes claims involving alleged negligence in the provision of medical, surgical, dental, nursing, or related care from the IRB authorisation regime. Clinical negligence proceeds directly to litigation without IRB assessment. The procedural rationale is sound: the IRB is structured to assess quantum where liability is straightforward, not to adjudicate the complex evidentiary disputes that characterise medical negligence.
The substantive standard for medical negligence in Ireland is set by the Supreme Court in Dunne (an infant) v National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91 — the practitioner must be guilty of such failure as no medical practitioner of equal specialist or general status and skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care. Establishing breach to that standard requires independent specialist medical reports. Such reports routinely cost between €2,000 and €20,000 to procure. The financial exposure involved, and the typical quantum of life-altering clinical injuries, make the High Court the natural forum.
From 28 April 2025 the President of the High Court has imposed dedicated case-management arrangements for clinical negligence via Practice Direction HC131 (case-management criteria for trial dates, including mandatory mediation engagement) and Practice Direction HC132 (the Clinical Negligence List within the Dublin Personal Injuries List, under a designated Judge in Charge). The combined effect is to isolate medical negligence from the standard common law motion lists and to require fully pleaded cases, completed discovery, and exchanged expert reports before a hearing date is allocated. This makes the High Court process tighter, not lighter — but the procedural reality is now incompatible with anything but a High Court action for clinical claims (see William Fry analysis; Eversheds Sutherland analysis).
For deeper treatment of medical negligence procedure, see the medical negligence hub.
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8. The Civil Reform Bill 2025: the proposed €100,000 Circuit Court limit
The Civil Reform Bill 2025 proposes to raise the Circuit Court personal injury limit from €60,000 to €100,000. The General Scheme of the Bill was published by the Minister for Justice on 6 January 2026 (see the General Scheme PDF). It implements the recommendations of the Kelly Report (Review of the Administration of Civil Justice, October 2020) and was approved by Government in July 2025.
What the General Scheme proposes
Part 5 of the General Scheme is the relevant Part for forum choice. Head 30 substitutes the existing Circuit Court monetary jurisdiction with €100,000 in each place — this is a single unified ceiling covering both general civil claims (up from €75,000) and personal injury actions (up from €60,000). Head 31 raises the District Court monetary jurisdiction from €15,000 to €20,000. Head 32 amends the Courts of Justice Act 1936, and Head 33 amends the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, to support the new architecture.
The General Scheme also contains substantial wider civil procedure reform — abolition of discovery in favour of a "production of documents" regime, a statutory presumption against adjournments, codification of judicial review, a 28-day default lis pendens, and a regulation-making power for pre-action protocols beyond clinical negligence (Head 19). The Government's stated objective is to "reduce legal costs by allowing more non-complex cases to be heard in lower courts" (per the Department of Justice press release).
Transitional strategy for borderline cases in 2026
While the General Scheme is at pre-legislative scrutiny, current law continues to apply. A claim issued today valued at €80,000 belongs in the High Court regardless of the proposed reform. There are three practical implications for forum choice during the transition.
First, the section 17(5) costs jurisprudence remains live. A practitioner who issues a €55,000 case in the High Court on the expectation that the limit will rise to €100,000 mid-litigation is still exposed to a differential costs order if the award lands at €55,000 under the current law — the date that matters is the date of issue, and the proposed limit is not yet operative. Second, the Personal Injuries Guidelines second edition has been vetoed; bracket values remain those set in 2021. The valuation framework that determines forum choice has not moved with inflation, even though the proposed jurisdictional limit reflects it. Third, the parliamentary timeline is uncertain. The Bill is at General Scheme stage only, with pre-legislative scrutiny ongoing in spring 2026; enactment in 2026 H2 to 2027 H1 is plausible but not guaranteed.
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9. Choice of court cannot save a stale claim: Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 21
The Supreme Court has reformulated the test for striking out actions for delay. In Kirwan v Connors & Ors [2025] IESC 21, decided on 30 May 2025, the Supreme Court reset the long-standing Primor test around Order 122 Rule 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts. Once two years of unexplained procedural inactivity have elapsed, the Order 122 Rule 11 jurisdiction is engaged and the claim may be dismissed. Beyond that point, the threshold for dismissal changes shape in successive bands, culminating at five years in a "generous power" to dismiss unless the plaintiff can demonstrate a "pressing exigency of justice" requiring the case to proceed.
Kirwan v Connors & Ors
[2025] IESC 21 — Supreme Court (O'Donnell CJ and Hogan J in majority, adopting the analysis of Murray J)
The Court adopted a four-band sliding-scale approach. Up to two years of inactivity, dismissal requires an abuse of process or prejudice at the Ó Domhnaill v Merrick threshold. After two years, the claim may be dismissed where, in addition to the period of inactivity, the moving party can point to some additional prejudice or other factor pointing towards dismissal. After four years of total inactivity, the claim should be dismissed if it is dependent on oral evidence, unless the plaintiff persuades the court that there are compelling reasons why the case should be permitted to continue. After five years of cumulative complete inactivity, the court has a generous power to dismiss the proceedings unless satisfied that there is a "pressing exigency of justice" requiring the case to go to trial — for example, exceptional educational, social or economic disadvantage suffered by the plaintiff, a compelling public interest in the matter being litigated, or serious misconduct by the defendant in the proceedings. The Court also confirmed that defendants are under no duty to prod the action forward — defendant inactivity does not bar relief (see William Fry analysis; Lacey Solicitors analysis).
The forum-choice implication is direct. A claimant who picks the wrong court (or selects a forum to avoid a defendant's section 17 warning) and then allows the Irish proceedings to drift for two-plus years risks dismissal independent of the substantive merits. Kirwan applies across personal injury practice — the High Court in Murphy v Aer Lingus Group plc & Anor [2025] IEHC 589 applied Kirwan to dismiss a personal injuries action for inordinate delay (twelve years between issue and the application to strike out — see Matheson analysis; William Fry analysis). Forum choice is the beginning of case management in Ireland, not a substitute for it.
Kirwan sits within a wider 2024–2025 delay-reform package. The Court Proceedings (Delays) Act 2024 (No. 12 of 2024, signed into law on 1 May 2024 and awaiting commencement as of May 2026) creates a statutory right for parties to litigation to seek a declaration that their proceedings were not concluded within a reasonable time and, in certain cases, compensation — assessed by a Chief Court Delays Assessor and Court Delays Assessors to be appointed under the Act, with onward application to the Circuit Court. The Act is a remedy for delay rather than a case-management tool: it does not displace the Kirwan dismissal jurisdiction or the Order 122 Rule 11 power; it operates alongside them by providing a backstop where excessive delay has already caused prejudice to a party.
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10. A practical framework for choosing the right court
Forum choice is a structured assessment, not a presumption. Practical decision-making turns on four sequential questions: what is the claim worth under the Guidelines, how complex is the liability and evidence picture, what is the section 17 risk, and how is the decision documented in the file. Each is treated in turn.
| Indicator | Points to Circuit Court | Points to High Court |
|---|---|---|
| Guidelines bracket value | Comfortably ≤ €55,000 | ≥ €60,000 or borderline with strong upside |
| Special damages (loss of earnings, future care) | Modest, fixed, easy to quantify | Significant, ongoing, requires actuarial input |
| Liability dispute | Liability admitted or near-certain | Liability genuinely contested |
| Expert evidence density | Single medical report sufficient | Multiple specialists; treating + independent |
| Psychological injury component | None or minor reactive | Diagnosed PTSD or chronic disorder |
| Type of claim | Standard road traffic, employer liability, public liability | Medical negligence; catastrophic injury; fatal injury |
| Defendant identity | Insured private defendant | State Claims Agency; large institutional defendant |
Three worked scenarios
The framework above is best illustrated through worked examples. The three scenarios below are anonymised composites; the analysis follows the four-step framework.
Scenario A — Clear Circuit Court case
A 28-year-old delivery driver suffers whiplash and a soft-tissue back injury in a rear-end road traffic collision in Co. Kildare. Liability is admitted in correspondence. Medical reports support a 12-month recovery with full resolution. Personal Injuries Guidelines bracket value: €18,000–€30,000. Special damages: €4,200 (loss of earnings + medical bills). Total realistic award range: €22,000–€34,000.
Forum analysis: the realistic range sits comfortably within the Circuit Court limit. No complexity factors. Liability admitted. The case belongs in the Circuit Court. A High Court issue would attract a near-certain section 17(5) order under Moin. Forum: Circuit Court (Kildare, where the tort occurred).
Scenario B — Clear High Court case
A 45-year-old hospital nurse suffers a herniated cervical disc requiring surgical fusion after a needlestick injury, with subsequent chronic pain syndrome and diagnosed PTSD. Liability is contested by the HSE. Multiple medical experts will be required (orthopaedic, pain consultant, psychiatrist, occupational therapist). Personal Injuries Guidelines bracket value: €65,000–€85,000. Special damages: significant ongoing loss of earnings and future care needs requiring actuarial input.
Forum analysis: realistic award range is above the Circuit Court ceiling. Liability is genuinely contested. Three or more specialist experts required. Diagnosed psychological injury. State Claims Agency defending. All five factors in the practitioner heuristic are present. Forum: High Court. Likely also under the Clinical Negligence List (HC131/HC132) if framed as clinical rather than employer liability.
Scenario C — Borderline case
A 38-year-old office worker suffers a knee injury in a public liability slip-and-fall. Personal Injuries Guidelines bracket value: €45,000–€55,000. Liability is contested — CCTV is ambiguous. One orthopaedic report supports a continuing 25% loss of function. Special damages: €8,000. Total realistic range: €53,000–€63,000.
Forum analysis: the upper end of the realistic range crosses the Circuit Court ceiling but only modestly. Liability is contested. Single specialist expert. No psychological component. Under the practitioner heuristic, two factors weigh toward the High Court (contested liability, future-loss component). The defendant is likely to send a section 17 warning letter early. Forum: Circuit Court is defensible with documented reasoning. High Court is also defensible if the file records the realistic upper estimate and the reasoning. Either way, the decision must be in writing on the file at the point of issue. If the High Court is chosen and the eventual award lands at €55,000, the trial judge has a discretionary section 17(5) decision under the Quinlan framework, and the contemporaneous file note becomes determinative.
Interactive forum choice decision tool
Step 1 — Value the claim under the Guidelines
Take general damages from the relevant bracket of the 2021 Personal Injuries Guidelines (the second edition was vetoed in July 2025 — see Section 6). Add special damages: loss of earnings to date, future loss capitalised at the appropriate multiplier, medical expenses, care costs, future medical expenses. The total is the realistic award figure. If that figure is comfortably below €55,000, the Circuit Court is the indicated forum. If it crosses €60,000 with confidence, the High Court is appropriate.
Step 2 — Assess complexity and liability risk
Value is necessary but not sufficient. A €40,000 case with genuinely contested liability, three medical experts, and significant discovery (production-of-documents) demand has legitimate reasons to be issued in the High Court — namely, the stricter case-management framework and the option of senior counsel. The Milmoe calibration shields plaintiffs whose forum choice was reasonable at the outset even where the eventual award is modest.
Step 3 — Consider section 17 risk and defendant warning letters
A defendant's section 17 warning letter changes the calculus materially. After Egan J's eighth principle in Quinlan, a plaintiff who ignores a warning letter and presses on in the High Court takes the full risk of a differential costs order. The correct response to a warning letter is to either (a) reassess valuation and apply to adjourn for a remittal application, or (b) reply in writing setting out the realistic upper estimate and the reasons for retaining the High Court forum. The reply protects the plaintiff's costs position at trial and is a normal feature of file management on borderline cases.
Step 4 — Document the forum choice in the file
The Egan J framework rewards files that show contemporaneous reasoning. A file note dated at the point of issue, setting out the Guidelines bracket used, the special damages calculation, the liability assessment, and the reasoning for forum choice, is the practitioner's primary protection if a section 17 application is later brought. Quinlan principle 5 — that the court considers whether continuing in the higher court was appropriate at each stage — also means the file should be updated when material new information arrives (medical reports, expert opinions, defendant offers).
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11. The appellate route from first instance
The appellate route in Ireland differs by court of issue. A Circuit Court personal injury judgment may be appealed to the High Court, which conducts a full rehearing. A High Court judgment may be appealed to the Court of Appeal, established by the Court of Appeal Act 2014. A Court of Appeal judgment may be further appealed to the Supreme Court, but only with leave on a matter of general public importance or in the interests of justice (Constitution, Article 34.5).
The forum choice at first instance therefore determines the appellate path and the appellate costs scale. A Circuit Court action remains within a relatively contained costs envelope on appeal because the High Court rehearing is exactly that — a hearing on Circuit Court costs scales by default. A High Court action moves into Court of Appeal costs on appeal, which are materially higher. The deep treatment of appeals belongs on the planned /court-process/appeals/ page.
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12. Frequently asked questions
Can I issue a personal injury claim in the High Court if it is worth less than €60,000?
Yes — there is no statutory bar on issuing a personal injury claim of any value in the High Court. The High Court has unlimited original civil jurisdiction. The practical question is not whether you may issue there, but whether you should.
Issuing a case worth less than €60,000 in the High Court exposes the plaintiff to a differential costs order under section 17(5) of the Courts Act 1981. After Moin v Sicika [2018] IECA 240, the trial judge is "incumbent" to make such an order absent good reasons — though Milmoe v Chatzis [2025] IECA 149 and Quinlan v Quinlan [2025] IEHC 170 have given content to what counts as good reason. Issuing in the High Court for a sub-€60,000 case is defensible where there is genuine uncertainty about value at the outset, where the case is genuinely complex on liability, or where future-loss components have material upside.
In practice: the file should record the reasoning at the date of issue. Borderline cases are properly issued in the High Court only with contemporaneous written justification.
What happens if my High Court personal injury award turns out to be under €60,000?
The trial judge has discretion to make a differential costs order under section 17(5) of the Courts Act 1981. The order requires the plaintiff to pay the defendant the difference between the costs actually incurred in the High Court and the costs that would have been incurred in the Circuit Court.
Whether the order is made depends on the circumstances. Significant factors include whether the value was reasonably uncertain at the outset, whether the defendant issued a section 17 warning letter, whether the plaintiff applied to remit when the picture became clearer, and the conduct of both sides in pre-trial engagement. Milmoe v Chatzis [2025] IECA 149 refused such an order where there had been no warning letter and the case was complex; Quinlan v Quinlan [2025] IEHC 170 made the order on a €25,000 award where a warning letter had issued and the plaintiff did not adjourn to remit.
In practice: a plaintiff who receives a warning letter mid-litigation should take it seriously. The plaintiff's contemporaneous response — and any application to adjourn for remittal — is what the trial judge examines if an application is made.
Does medical negligence always go to the High Court?
In practice, almost always — but not by virtue of any statutory direction. Medical negligence claims are exempt from the Injuries Resolution Board under section 3(d) of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003, and the typical quantum of clinical negligence claims places them above the €60,000 Circuit Court ceiling.
The factors driving the High Court default are the cost of independent expert medical reports (€2,000–€20,000 per report), the complexity of proving breach to the Dunne v National Maternity Hospital standard, the lengthy discovery typically required, and the value of life-altering clinical injuries. From 28 April 2025 the High Court's Practice Directions HC131 and HC132 also impose tailored case-management arrangements via a dedicated Clinical Negligence List.
In practice: a clinical negligence claim where quantum is genuinely modest may be issued in the Circuit Court — but the practitioner should expect the procedural reality of a complex liability dispute to push toward the High Court.
When will the Circuit Court personal injury limit rise to €100,000?
The €100,000 limit is proposed under the General Scheme of the Civil Reform Bill 2025, published on 6 January 2026. It is not yet enacted as of May 2026. The €60,000 limit remains operative.
Typical Irish legislative timelines from General Scheme to enactment run twelve to twenty-four months, and the Bill is now in pre-legislative scrutiny in the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Justice. Enactment in late 2026 to mid-2027 is plausible but not guaranteed; commencement may be phased. The Government's competitiveness review in 2024 described overall progress on civil-justice reform as "slow" — the political momentum is real but the timeline is not fixed.
In practice: until the Bill is enacted and the relevant commencement order is made, every reference to the €100,000 figure in legal correspondence should be qualified as proposed and not yet operative.
Can a case be moved from the High Court to the Circuit Court after it has been issued?
Yes — by application to remit under section 11(2) of the Courts of Justice Act 1936. A defendant typically applies once particulars, medical reports, and a defence have been exchanged and the case can be properly valued. The application is heard before a High Court judge. Where granted, the proceedings continue in the Circuit Court as if originally commenced there.
The plaintiff retains a key protection. Under section 20 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 (as substituted by section 16 of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013), the Circuit Court can award damages in excess of its normal monetary jurisdiction on a remitted action. A plaintiff who agrees to remittal does not therefore cap their damages — the safety valve preserves the original quantum potential.
In practice: resisting a well-founded remittal application is rarely sensible. The differential costs order downside at trial significantly outweighs the marginal Forum advantage of remaining in the High Court for a properly Circuit-value claim.
Who decides which court my case goes to — me, my solicitor, or the IRB?
The decision is made by the plaintiff on legal advice. The Injuries Resolution Board does not direct court choice. The IRB assesses the claim under the Personal Injuries Guidelines and issues an authorisation when assessment is rejected or where assessment is not made. After authorisation issues, the plaintiff (advised by their solicitor) decides which court to issue in.
The IRB's own assessment is a strong indicator. A claim assessed by the IRB at €40,000 is presumptively a Circuit Court case unless complexity factors push otherwise. A claim assessed at €75,000 is presumptively a High Court case unless the parties consent to lift the Circuit Court limit.
In practice: the forum choice should be made and documented at the point of issuing proceedings, on the basis of the medical reports, the IRB assessment (where one exists), and the practitioner's valuation under the Personal Injuries Guidelines.
What is a section 17 warning letter and what should I do if I receive one?
A section 17 warning letter is a written notice from the defendant's solicitor stating that the defendant considers the claim to fall within the jurisdiction of a lower court and that the defendant will apply for a differential costs order under section 17(5) of the Courts Act 1981 if the plaintiff continues in the higher court and the award lands within the lower court's range.
The warning letter is not a strict prerequisite for a differential costs order (per Quinlan principle 7), but its absence weighs heavily against making one (per Milmoe). Conversely, its presence makes the order significantly harder for a plaintiff to resist if the award is within the lower court's jurisdiction (per Quinlan principle 6).
The appropriate response is one of: (a) re-value the claim, and if revised valuation puts it within the lower court, apply to adjourn the trial date and remit the action; or (b) reply in writing setting out the realistic upper estimate, the special damages calculation, and the reasons for retaining the higher court forum. Either response demonstrates the contemporaneous reasoning that Egan J in Quinlan identified as protective.
In practice: ignoring a warning letter is the costliest course. Both responses listed are defensible; doing nothing is not.
Can the Injuries Resolution Board direct me to use the Circuit Court or High Court?
No. The Injuries Resolution Board does not direct forum choice. The IRB assesses the claim under the Personal Injuries Guidelines and either issues an assessment (which the claimant can accept or reject) or, where assessment is not appropriate, issues an authorisation to proceed to litigation.
The IRB assessment figure is, however, a strong indicator. A claim that the IRB assesses at €40,000 is presumptively a Circuit Court case unless complexity factors push otherwise. A claim assessed at €75,000 is presumptively a High Court case unless the parties consent to lift the Circuit Court limit. The claimant (advised by their solicitor) makes the final forum decision at the point of issuing proceedings, after authorisation.
In practice: the IRB assessment is one input among several. Liability dispute, complexity, expert density, and future-loss exposure can all justify a forum decision that diverges from the IRB number.
What happens if my injury gets worse after I issue in the Circuit Court?
The plaintiff has options. Where new medical evidence indicates the claim is worth more than the Circuit Court ceiling of €60,000, the plaintiff can apply to have the proceedings transferred to the High Court. Alternatively, where the case has already been remitted from the High Court, the Circuit Court can award damages above its normal limit on the remitted action under section 20 of the Courts of Justice Act 1936 (as substituted by section 16 of the Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013).
What the plaintiff cannot do is unilaterally relocate proceedings already on foot in the Circuit Court to the High Court without an application. Defendants may object to transfer applications if the value increase is borderline or speculative.
In practice: the file should be updated with each new medical report. Where worsening crosses a jurisdictional threshold, the application to transfer should be made promptly rather than at trial.
Does the choice of court affect how long my personal injury case takes?
Yes. The three courts operate on different timelines. District Court personal injury actions typically reach trial in 9–14 months from issue. Circuit Court personal injury actions typically reach trial in 14–24 months. High Court personal injury actions outside the clinical negligence list typically reach trial in 24–36 months, with clinical negligence cases under the HC131/HC132 case-management regime running 30–48 months from issue.
These timelines are indicative and vary by venue. The Justice Indicators report (Law Society, 2024) recorded average Irish civil case disposal times materially above the European average. The Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 21 case-management reforms are intended to tighten timelines, and the Court Proceedings (Delays) Act 2024 — once commenced — will provide a parallel statutory remedy (declaration and compensation) for unreasonable delay. The practical effect of both reforms is still working through.
In practice: a borderline-value claimant who needs a faster resolution may prefer the Circuit Court even where the High Court would technically be defensible.
Can the plaintiff and defendant insist on different courts in Ireland?
The plaintiff chooses the forum at the point of issuing proceedings. The defendant cannot prevent the plaintiff from issuing in their chosen court but may apply to remit the proceedings to a lower court if the defendant considers the eventual award will fall within that court's jurisdiction. The application is heard by the High Court (under section 11(2) Courts of Justice Act 1936) or the Circuit Court (under section 15 Courts Act 1991), and the decision is judicial.
The reverse is also possible. A defendant who would prefer the higher court (e.g., to access certain procedural mechanisms or to make case-management more demanding for the plaintiff) cannot unilaterally upgrade the forum, but the parties can consent to lift the Circuit Court limit and have a higher-value claim heard there.
In practice: contested forum choice usually comes down to a remit application. The court applies the section 17(5) jurisprudence (the Moin–Milmoe–Quinlan framework) in deciding whether to grant remittal.
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13. Related resources and cross-references
- Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004 — explainer (statutory definition of "personal injuries action" at section 2; verifying affidavits at section 14; formal offers at section 17 — distinct from the section 17 in the Courts Act 1981)
- Judicial Council Act 2019 — explainer (Personal Injuries Guidelines framework; Delaney v PIAB [2024] IESC 10 treatment)
- Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 — explainer (pre-litigation authorisation; medical negligence exemption at section 3(d))
- The 2026 update to the Personal Injuries Guidelines (Guidelines status; second-edition veto)
- Medical negligence hub (clinical negligence procedure; Dunne standard; HC131/HC132 case management)
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14. About the author
Gary Matthews is a Principal Solicitor and the founder of Gary Matthews Solicitors (Law Society of Ireland Practising Certificate No. S8178). The firm is based at 3rd Floor, Ormond Building, 31–36 Ormond Quay Upper, Dublin D07. Gary's practice focuses on personal injury and medical negligence litigation, with experience in road traffic, employer liability, public liability, and clinical negligence claims across the Circuit Court and the High Court in Ireland.
Practice focus and areas of work
Gary advises claimants on the full lifecycle of personal injury litigation, from Injuries Resolution Board (IRB) assessment and authorisation through to issuing proceedings, case management, and trial or settlement. The forum-choice considerations addressed in this article — section 17(5) costs jurisprudence, remittal mechanics, the binding effect of the Personal Injuries Guidelines, and the proposed reforms under the Civil Reform Bill 2025 — are issues he engages with regularly on borderline-value claims in the €40,000–€70,000 range, where the choice between the Circuit Court and the High Court carries the most significant costs and procedural consequences for clients.
Approach to forum-choice analysis
The firm's working approach to forum choice is documented in this article's practical framework and three worked scenarios. Every personal injury matter the firm takes on receives a documented forum-choice analysis at the point of issuing proceedings: a Guidelines-bracket valuation, a special-damages calculation, a liability and complexity assessment, and a contemporaneous file note recording the reasoning — the same documentation pattern that Egan J in Quinlan v Quinlan [2025] IEHC 170 identified as protective against later section 17(5) applications. Where a defendant issues a section 17 warning letter mid-litigation, the firm responds in writing with a re-stated upper estimate and the documented reasons for retaining the chosen forum, preserving the contemporaneous record on which the trial judge's discretion turns.
Currency of this article
This article reflects current Irish jurisdictional and costs jurisprudence as of 13 May 2026, including the section 17(5) appellate authorities (Moin v Sicika [2018] IECA 240, Milmoe v Chatzis [2025] IECA 149, Quinlan v Quinlan [2025] IEHC 170), the Supreme Court's Delaney v PIAB [2024] IESC 10 confirmation of the Personal Injuries Guidelines, the Kirwan v Connors [2025] IESC 21 reformulation of delay-dismissal principles, and the proposed reforms in the General Scheme of the Civil Reform Bill 2025 (published 6 January 2026). It is reviewed quarterly and on the trigger events identified in the framework — new Supreme Court or Court of Appeal authority on section 17(5), enactment of the Civil Reform Bill 2025, or new Personal Injuries Guidelines.
For questions on a specific matter, the firm can be contacted on 01 903 6408. This article remains educational in scope and does not constitute legal advice.
What this page does not cover
This article is the cluster anchor for forum choice in Irish personal injury claims. It does not aim to be exhaustive on adjacent topics. Out of scope: the deep doctrinal treatment of section 17(5) and Calderbank/lodgement strategy (covered in the planned /court-process/costs-orders-calderbank/ page); appellate procedure beyond a summary of the routes (/court-process/appeals/); the substantive standard for medical negligence beyond the procedural Dunne reference (/medical-negligence/); valuation methodology under the Personal Injuries Guidelines (/personal-injury-claims/the-2026-update-to-the-personal-injuries-guidelines/); and the IRB authorisation process (/injuries-resolution-board/). Readers seeking depth on those topics are directed to the cross-references at Section 13.
Terms commonly confused
Four Irish costs concepts often blur into each other. Each operates differently and serves a different procedural purpose.
- Differential costs order (section 17(5) Courts Act 1981)
- An order made at trial requiring a plaintiff who issued in a higher court to pay the defendant the difference between higher-court costs and the costs that would have been incurred in the appropriate lower court, where the eventual award falls within the lower court's jurisdiction.
- Calderbank letter (without-prejudice settlement offer)
- A written settlement offer marked "without prejudice save as to costs", made by one party to the other before trial, which the trial judge may consider when determining costs at the end of the case. A Calderbank offer is not paid into court and is not seen by the trial judge until the costs hearing.
- Lodgement (Order 22 RSC / Order 15 CCR)
- A formal payment by the defendant into court (or, under the amended rules, a tender offer in lieu) of a specified sum in settlement. If the plaintiff does not better the lodgement at trial, the plaintiff pays the defendant's costs from the date of lodgement. Procedurally distinct from a Calderbank letter.
- Costs follow the event (default rule)
- The default rule that the successful party is entitled to costs from the unsuccessful party, codified in section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015. The default rule is what creates the costs-exposure that the section 17(5) discretion, Calderbank letters, and lodgements all interact with.
The four concepts share a common feature — they shape who pays whose costs at the end of a case — but they operate at different procedural moments and through different judicial discretions. The section 17(5) differential costs order is the one that turns on choice of court; the others turn on settlement engagement.
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15. References
Primary sources — legislation
- Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland), Article 34, Article 35.2.
- Courts of Justice Act 1924, section 25 (remittal from High Court — primary text: HC→Circuit Court; proviso: HC→District Court where action should not have been commenced in High Court).
- Courts of Justice Act 1936, section 11(2) (remittal to Circuit Court); section 20 (as substituted by section 16 CCLMPA 2013).
- Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961.
- Courts Act 1981, section 17 — costs of action; section 17(5) — differential costs.
- Courts Act 1991, section 14 (substituting s.17(5) CA 1981) and section 15 (Circuit to District remittal).
- Courts and Court Officers Act 2002.
- Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003, section 3(d) (medical negligence exemption).
- Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004, sections 2, 10, 14, 17, 22.
- Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013, section 2(1), Part 3, section 16.
- SI 566/2013 — Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 (Jurisdiction of District and Circuit Court) (Commencement) Order 2013.
- Court of Appeal Act 2014.
- SI 17/2014 — District Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2014, Rule 8.
- Judicial Council Act 2019, section 7(2)(g) (held unconstitutional in Delaney).
- Family Leave and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2021, section 30.
- Personal Injuries Resolution Board Act 2022.
- Court Proceedings (Delays) Act 2024 (No. 12 of 2024; enacted 1 May 2024; awaiting commencement).
- Courts, Civil Law, Criminal Law and Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2024.
- General Scheme of the Civil Reform Bill 2025 (published 6 January 2026; not yet enacted).
Primary sources — case law
- O'Connor v Bus Átha Cliath [2003] 4 IR 459 (Supreme Court, Hardiman J) — BAILII.
- Moin v Sicika and O'Malley v McEvoy [2018] IECA 240 (Court of Appeal, Peart J).
- Delaney v The Personal Injuries Assessment Board, the Judicial Council, Ireland and the Attorney General [2024] IESC 10 (Supreme Court).
- Milmoe v Chatzis & Anor [2025] IECA 149 (Court of Appeal).
- Martina Quinlan v Michael Quinlan [2025] IEHC 170 (High Court, Egan J).
- Kirwan v Connors & Ors [2025] IESC 21 (Supreme Court, Murray J).
- Putniene v McDonald & Ors [2025] IEHC 682 (High Court, Twomey J).
- Murphy v Aer Lingus Group plc & Anor [2025] IEHC 589 (High Court — applied Kirwan to PI).
- Dunne v National Maternity Hospital [1989] IR 91 (Supreme Court — standard for clinical negligence).
Official administrative sources
- Courts Service of Ireland — Circuit Court civil cases.
- Courts Service of Ireland — What happens in the Circuit Court (civil).
- Rules of the Superior Courts (RSC), including Order 122 Rule 11 and Order 49.
- Injuries Resolution Board.
- Judicial Council — Personal Injuries Guidelines.
- Department of Justice press release — publication of Civil Reform Bill 2025 General Scheme (6 January 2026).
- Review of the Administration of Civil Justice ("Kelly Report"), October 2020.
Practitioner commentary (cited for attribution)
- Law Society of Ireland Gazette, "Different Strokes" (analysis of Moin v Sicika).
- Mason Hayes Curran, "Court Refuses Differential Costs Appeal in Medical Negligence Case" (analysis of Milmoe v Chatzis).
- Tughans, "Court of Appeal Clarifies Discretion in Differential Costs Orders Under Section 17".
- DAC Beachcroft, "Grounds for Differential Costs Orders" (analysis of Quinlan v Quinlan).
- William Fry, "High Court Applies Kirwan v Connors Reformulated Test in Delay Cases".
- Law Society Gazette, "Civil-Law Bill Includes Judicial-Review Overhaul" (January 2026).
- Irish Times reportage of Delaney v PIAB (9 April 2024).
- Irish Legal News reportage of Putniene v McDonald (December 2025).
References last verified 13 May 2026. Where a URL has moved, the canonical legal source is the irishstatutebook.ie ELI URI for legislation or courts.ie for case law.
Gary Matthews Solicitors
Medical negligence solicitors, Dublin
We help people every day of the week (weekends and bank holidays included) that have either been injured or harmed as a result of an accident or have suffered from negligence or malpractice.
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