Why Children's Settlements Need Court Approval in Ireland

A child cannot give a legally binding discharge of a personal injuries claim, so Irish law makes judicial approval the condition of validity for every settlement made on a child's behalf. A person under 18 lacks capacity to compromise a claim or to release a defendant, and a parent cannot supply that capacity for them. The courts therefore stand in as the final check: understanding what the judge is checking for is the key to understanding the whole procedure. The ruling protects the child against under-settlement, protects the next friend against later criticism, and protects the defendant, who receives an order it can safely rely on as ending the claim.

An infant ruling is the court hearing at which a judge approves or refuses a settlement made on behalf of a child. "Infant" is simply the traditional legal term for a person under 18, so a ruling, an infant ruling, and court approval of a settlement for a minor all describe the same hearing; it is short, protective and non-adversarial.

The requirement applies however the figure was reached: through an assessment by the Injuries Resolution Board (IRB), through mediation, through direct negotiation with an insurer, or in proceedings before a court, including medical negligence actions that never touch the IRB. Whichever route produced the settlement of the child's claim, the route out is the same: a judge rules it. That single gate is what determines how compensation for injury in Ireland actually reaches an injured child, and it is why defendants and insurers will not pay out on a child's case without a ruling order.

The Irish gate is also wider than its neighbours': in Northern Ireland, court approval of a child's settlement agreed before proceedings issue remains voluntary, and England and Wales runs a distinct procedure under its own civil procedure rules, so UK guidance does not describe the position in Ireland.

The Legal Basis: Order 22 Rule 10, Section 35 and Section 63

Three legal layers combine to produce the approval requirement, and they are regularly confused with one another. The common law supplies the underlying incapacity: a minor's compromise gives no good discharge. The rules of court then state the consequence, and two statutes bolt on the IRB pathway and a costs shield. Reading the three together is what most published summaries never do.

Order 22, rule 10 of the Rules of the Superior Courts

The operative rule is Order 22, rule 10(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, substituted with effect from 25 May 2023 by S.I. No. 261 of 2023. In any cause or matter where money or damages are claimed by or on behalf of a ward, a child, or a person with a decision-making representation order in force under section 38(2)(b) of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, the rule provides that no settlement or compromise or payment or acceptance of money paid into Court is valid as regards that person's claim without the approval of the court.

The 2023 substitution modernised the rule's language: the old reference to an "infant or person of unsound mind" has been replaced with terminology aligned to the 2015 Act. Equivalent provision is made in the Circuit Court and District Court rules, and the District Court rules also require a certified extract from the Register of Births at any approval hearing.

Section 35 of the PIAB Act 2003 (the IRB route)

Where the child's claim went through the Injuries Resolution Board, section 35 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003 carries the same protection onto the assessment track. The next friend may accept the Board's assessment, but under section 35(4) the acceptance does not bind the child unless and until the appropriate court approves it. Section 35(5) then directs where the application goes: the court possessing the lesser or the least jurisdiction to make an award of the assessed amount. The Board, established under the 2003 Act as the Personal Injuries Assessment Board, has operated as the Injuries Resolution Board since 14 December 2023 under the Personal Injuries Resolution Board Act 2022; the statutory approval mechanics are unchanged by the renaming.

Section 63 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 (the costs shield)

Section 63 of the Civil Liability Act 1961 is frequently miscited as the source of the whole approval requirement. It is narrower and cleverer than that. Where a defendant lodges money in court in an action in which the plaintiff is a child, section 63(1) lets the plaintiff apply to the judge to decide whether the lodgment should be accepted or the action should go to trial. If the judge sends the case to trial and the eventual award does not beat the lodgment, costs are at the judge's discretion rather than following the usual lodgment penalty.

In an adult claim, failing to beat a lodgment or tender ordinarily means paying the defendant's costs from the date of lodgment; section 63 removes that automatic squeeze from children's cases. In practice this gives the next friend room to refuse a borderline offer without gambling the family's finances, which is precisely the kind of pressure the ruling system exists to relieve.

The Next Friend's Role in a Ruling

The next friend brings the application, swears the grounding affidavit, and carries the litigation risk until the ruling is made. A child sues by a next friend, usually a parent or guardian, who must sign a consent to act and authorise the solicitor, and who must have no interest adverse to the child's. The adverse-interest rule has teeth: a parent who was driving in the collision that injured their child passenger cannot act, because the defendant might seek contribution from that parent, and an independent adult must take the role instead. The next friend is also the person exposed on costs if proceedings fail, subject to any indemnity from the child's own resources, and the High Court has noted that a next friend can even face personal costs exposure in the assessment-approval context discussed below.

Eligibility questions, who can act and when a replacement is appointed, are covered on the claim-side guides to claims for children and medical negligence claims for children; this page stays with the court process itself.

How Does a Ruling Hearing Work for a Child's Personal Injury Claim in Ireland?

The application is made ex parte, on affidavit, to the court that matches the settlement, and the hearing itself is usually short. Because the application protects rather than contests, it is not served on the defendant. The Courts Service guide lists what must accompany it: full details of the proposed settlement, the child's original birth certificate, the sworn grounding affidavit, and the medical reports on which the settlement was valued. In the High Court, a written opinion of counsel on the adequacy of the settlement must also be submitted; in practice counsel's opinion is commonly obtained for Circuit Court rulings too, although the guide states the requirement for the High Court.

Venue follows value. Broadly, settlements up to EUR 15,000 are ruled in the District Court, settlements above that and up to EUR 60,000 in the Circuit Court, and larger settlements in the High Court. The Civil Reform Bill 2025, published in General Scheme form in January 2026 and not yet law, proposes raising those bands; the current thresholds and the reform's progress are tracked on the Circuit Court and High Court jurisdiction page. Two venue rules are specific to children's cases. Where proceedings have issued, the ruling is made by the court seised of the action. Where the settlement is an accepted IRB assessment, section 35(5) sends the application to the court of least jurisdiction able to award the assessed sum: in Dunne (a minor) v Stapleton [2020] IEHC 1 the High Court pointed out that an assessment of roughly EUR 21,000 belonged in the Circuit Court for that reason.

On the day, the hearing is brief and non-adversarial, commonly between ten and thirty minutes. The judge reads the medical evidence and any opinion of counsel, may ask the next friend how the child has recovered, and occasionally asks to see the child, particularly where scarring must be assessed. What is the judge actually weighing? Whether the figure is fair against the nature and prognosis of the injuries, whether it serves the child's best interests rather than anyone else's convenience, the litigation risk if the case ran to trial, and, where relevant, contributory negligence measured against a child of the same age and understanding rather than against a reasonable adult. In practice the questions are gentle and factual: recovery, any remaining symptoms, and whether school and sport have resumed.

Since the pandemic-era reforms under the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020, many rulings are still conducted remotely, with in-person hearings retained where an injury must be inspected or the next friend wishes to address the court directly. If satisfied, the judge approves the settlement and it becomes a court order: the ruling.

Where several children are injured in the same accident, each child's claim is a separate claim, and each settlement is ruled separately on its own evidence.

The ruling from settlement to lodgment: eight steps

Laid end to end, the process runs as follows. How quickly the ruling is listed varies by court and term, which is why the three-month application window is the fixed point to plan around. With that window, the seven-week lodgment rule and the Accountant's two-to-three-week processing as the fixed points, a straightforward ruling runs its course in months rather than years.

1. Settlement agreed, subject to approval: with an insurer, through the IRB, in mediation or in proceedings.
2. Application prepared promptly: within three months of settlement, by ex parte docket grounded on the next friend's sworn affidavit.
3. Exhibits assembled: full settlement details, the original birth certificate, the medical reports, and counsel's opinion for High Court rulings.
4. Listing: before the court matching the settlement value, or the court of least jurisdiction for an IRB assessment.
5. The ruling hearing: short and non-adversarial; the judge reviews the evidence and may ask the next friend about the child's recovery.
6. Outcome: approval makes the settlement a court order; refusal sends the parties back to renegotiate, improve the offer or gather further evidence.
7. Lodgment: the attested schedule goes to the Accountant of the Courts of Justice without delay, and within seven weeks of the perfected order.
8. Holding: the fund is invested until the child turns 18, with limited early release for needs beyond day-to-day costs.

Court Approval of IRB Assessments for Children

An IRB assessment accepted for a child is provisional until a judge approves it, and the modern case law on that approval comes from two written High Court judgments. Both were delivered by Simons J, and between them they define what the court is doing when it rules on an assessment made in a child's personal injury claim.

Court approval is intended to ensure that the interests of vulnerable persons are properly protected in the settlement of a child's proceedings.

per Simons J in C. v An Unnamed Driver [2023] IEHC 651, as reported by Irish Legal News

One further boundary is worth marking. In fatal injuries cases under section 48 of the Civil Liability Act 1961, the High Court held in H (A Minor) v Adelaide and Meath Hospital [2020] IEHC 81 that statutory dependants who are adults of full capacity can settle without court assessment where all consent in writing, while the shares of dependants who are children still require approval. Where a child is among the dependants, our guide to who can claim in a fatal injury case covers the family side; the ruling requirement follows the child.

If the Judge Does Not Approve the Settlement

Refusal means the settlement simply never takes effect, and the claim continues as if the offer had not been accepted. The judge cannot rewrite the parties' agreement downward, and the Courts Service guide describes the pressure running the other way: a judge who considers the figure too low will withhold approval, and in practice that produces either a renegotiation, an improved offer tendered there and then, or a direction to obtain further medical evidence before the ruling returns. Nothing is lost to the child by a refusal; that is the design.

The consequences then depend on the route. In litigation, the action proceeds toward hearing, with the section 63 costs shield available if the sum had been lodged. On the IRB track, section 36 of the 2003 Act obliges the Board, once the court refuses approval, to issue an authorisation permitting the claimant to bring proceedings. Solicitors who regularly conduct rulings tend to treat a wobbling application as a signal to strengthen the evidence rather than to force the issue: an adjournment for an updated report is a routine outcome where a prognosis has not yet settled.

Where the Money Goes: Funds in Court Until 18

The approved settlement is not paid to the parents: it is lodged with the Accountant of the Courts of Justice and held for the child. The ruling order directs lodgment, and High Court Practice Direction HC19 is strict about speed: the solicitor should bespeak the perfected order and attend the Accountant with an attested copy of the schedule without delay, a delay beyond seven weeks from perfection is regarded as unreasonable, and the court may consider recouping any resulting loss to the child from the person responsible. A parallel timing rule polices the approval application itself: where a case settles subject to approval and the plaintiff's solicitor has not applied within three months, the defendant's solicitor is at liberty to have the case listed for mention. Once the schedule is lodged, the Accountant's Office typically processes the payment within two to three weeks.

The funds are then invested under the court's directions for the child's benefit, and in catastrophic cases the court may instead approve periodic payment orders under the Civil Liability (Amendment) Act 2017, index-linked annual payments designed for lifelong care needs of the kind seen in cases such as Russell v HSE. Where a young person will lack capacity at 18, management of the fund engages the framework of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 rather than the historic wardship system.

At 18, the money matures without any further ruling. The now-adult applies directly to the Accountant's Office on a personal application form, for which there is no fee, or a solicitor applies by affidavit exhibiting the original birth certificate. The name on the application must match the name on the court order and the birth certificate, and a mismatch means a court application to amend before payment out; the Accountant's Office also requires the applicant's PPS number and verified bank details before it can pay. One fee difference by venue is worth knowing in advance: for High Court awards, a payment-out fee of EUR 1.15 per EUR 100 applies (the first EUR 100 exempt) capped at EUR 1,200 under Part 5 of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court (Fees) Order 2014 (S.I. No. 492 of 2014), while District Court and Circuit Court awards carry no equivalent charge.

The tax position deserves one careful paragraph, because it is routinely oversimplified. The settlement capital itself is exempt: personal injuries compensation is not subject to income tax or capital gains tax in the claimant's hands. The interest and investment return earned while the fund sits in court is different, and can be liable to income tax when the fund is released, unless the strict exemption in section 189 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 applies because the individual is permanently and totally incapacitated from maintaining themselves, as set out in the Revenue Commissioners' guidance on the exemption of investment income. A child who fully recovers from a fracture will not meet that test; a child with a catastrophic birth injury may. Families should take financial advice at the point of release, and nothing here is tax advice.

Accessing Funds Before the Child Turns 18

Early release is possible, but only for needs beyond the ordinary cost of raising the child. The next friend, or the solicitor, applies ex parte in the court that made the ruling, grounded on a sworn affidavit setting out exactly why the money is needed now. The Courts Service guide states the standard plainly: the court usually only approves payments for expenses beyond normal day-to-day costs. Applications that succeed tend to involve injury-connected or welfare-critical spending: specialist medical or orthodontic treatment not otherwise covered, therapies, assistive equipment, home adaptations for a disabled child, or specific educational needs. General household bills, clothing and routine schooling costs are what the fund is protected against.

The mechanics differ slightly by venue. In the District Court the application fee is EUR 15 and in the Circuit Court EUR 60, with the judge hearing the reasons for the withdrawal; for High Court funds, the application is considered by the Master or Deputy Master, who may seek further information before deciding, and an approved order is transmitted to the Accountant's Office for payment in accordance with its terms. Quotes or invoices for the intended spending, exhibited to the affidavit, make the application concrete and are the practical difference between a smooth release and an adjournment.

Are Infant Rulings Public?

The default is a public hearing, because a ruling is the administration of justice under Article 34.1 of the Constitution. Justice is administered in public save in such special and limited cases as may be prescribed by law, and no statute has been enacted prescribing infant rulings as one of those cases. Section 45(1)(c) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 permits proceedings in "lunacy and minor matters" to be heard otherwise than in public, and it has been argued in the Law Society Gazette that this could accommodate rulings, but there is no reported decision applying it to them and the open-court default stands.

What the courts do have is the jurisdiction recognised in Sunday Newspapers Ltd v Gilchrist and Rogers [2017] IESC 18, [2017] 2 IR 284: any departure from a public hearing is exceptional and must be strictly justified, with lesser measures such as anonymisation or reporting restrictions considered first. In sensitive cases, practitioners apply for exactly those lesser measures. The practical texture has also shifted: since 2020 a large share of rulings are heard remotely, which does not change their legal status as public hearings but has, in practice, reduced casual public exposure of families on ruling day.

Frequently Asked Questions